The real value of the US dollar has fluctuated widely during the global financial crisis and its aftermath. Beginning in early 2008 through early 2009, the dollar strengthened against most currencies but weakened considerably in the intervening months. We propose a decomposition of the forces driving the real exchange rate into a long run real interest rate component and a residual "level" risk premium component. If real interest rates in the United States rise relative to its partners, the value of the dollar should strengthen. Likewise, if the level risk premium on foreign interest-bearing assets rises, the dollar should also strengthen. We find that little of the recent movements in the dollar are directly attributable to the real interest component, suggesting that most of the movements are due to the residual risk premium component.
The real value of the US dollar has fluctuated widely during the global financial crisis and its aftermath. Beginning in early 2008 through early 2009, the dollar strengthened against most currencies but weakened considerably in the intervening months. We propose a decomposition of the forces driving the real exchange rate into a long run real interest rate component and a residual "level" risk premium component. If real interest rates in the United States rise relative to its partners, the value of the dollar should strengthen. Likewise, if the level risk premium on foreign interest-bearing assets rises, the dollar should also strengthen. We find that little of the recent movements in the dollar are directly attributable to the real interest component, suggesting that most of the movements are due to the residual risk premium component.
There is a large and diverse literature that affords a role to real interest differentials and to risk premiums in determining the real value of a currency. Our approach is almost purely definitional. The only assumptions we rely on are those of stationarity-of the real exchange rate and the US-foreign real interest differential. Specifically, let q t denote the log of the real exchange rate, defined as the foreign consumer price level (converted into dollar terms by the nominal exchange rate) divided by the US consumer price level. A decrease in q t represents a real appreciation of the dollar. We can then define the excess return on foreign interest-bearing assets as:
The relative foreign to US real return equals the difference between foreign and US real interest rates, plus the expected real depreciation of the dollar, E t q t+1 − q t . We take the no-bubbles forward solution to equation (1) and use the stationarity of the real exchange rate so that the limit as j → ∞ of E t q t+j is __ q , the unconditional mean of q t :
In equation (2), we make the mild assumption that the present values converge. We call R t the long run real interest differential, Λ t the level risk premium. According to equation (2), holding Λ t constant, an increase in R t implies a real dollar appreciation: when the expected sum of all current and future US real interest rates rises relative to the foreign counterpart, the dollar gets stronger.
The level risk premium Λ t represents the infinite sum of the expected excess return on foreign assets for all periods in the future. While typically the international finance literature uses the term "risk premium" to refer to excess returns, here we follow the work of Maurice Obstfeld and Kenneth Rogoff (2003) to refer to the effect of these risk premiums on the level of the real exchange rate. Holding real interest rates constant, a larger λ t implies a higher excess return on the foreign investment. Holding R t constant, a larger Λ t implies the dollar is stronger in real terms.
While we call Λ t a risk premium, we do not necessarily endorse the position that the excess return represents a reward for bearing risk. Indeed, λ t might instead (or as well) capture one or more of the following: (i) a liquidity premium, if foreign assets were less liquid than US assets; (ii) a deviation of the market's expectation from the statistical expectation (Jeffrey A. Frankel and Kenneth A. Froot 1987) ; (iii) sluggish portfolio adjustment (Philippe Bacchetta and Eric van Wincoop forthcoming); (iv) heterogeneous information across market participants (Bacchetta and van Wincoop 2006) . In sum, while we call λ t a risk premium and Λ t a level risk premium in order to have some convenient label, we do not take a stand on the economic forces that lead to nonzero values of Λ t : λ t is defined by equation (1) irrespective of economic interpretation.
Our goal in this paper is to estimate R t and compute Λ t = −(q t − __ q ) − R t for six currency pairs noted below, and then to examine their movements.
I. Measurement
The monthly currency pairs we study are the real value of the dollar relative to the euro (as represented by an aggregate of the real value of three major eurozone countries: Germany, France, and Italy), the UK pound, the Swiss franc, the Canadian dollar, and the Japanese yen. We also consider the dollar exchange rate against an aggregate of these currencies.
1 Our nominal exchange rates are from the Federal Reserve database, for the last day of the month. We use 30-day Eurocurrency deposit rates, end of month, as our measure of the nominal interest rate, from Datastream. Inflation rates are constructed from consumer price index data available from the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). Our vector and regressive (VAR) analysis also includes monthly unemployment data from the OECD and monthly commodity price inflation, calculated from the nonfuel commodity dollar price index available from International Finance Statistics. We multiply all series by 100.
Estimation of R t requires estimates of
We estimate a five-variable VAR for the United States relative to each country (or country aggregate in the case of the eurozone countries and the seven-country aggregate) that includes the US relative to foreign values of the nominal interest rate, the inflation rate, the real exchange rate, and the unemployment rate, as well as the dollar commodity inflation rate. Our VAR includes three lags of each variable.
We include the relative unemployment rates in the two countries as a simple measure of the relative output gaps. This variable may be helpful in forecasting future inflation, because a Phillips curve relates inflation rates to the output gap. In addition, interest rates set by monetary policymakers might respond to the unemployment rate. For a similar reason, we include commodity inflation. Inflation in the dollar price of commodities might help forecast relative inflation especially because commodity prices are forward looking and respond to inflation news. We do not, however, take a structural stand on what forces drive our measures of the real interest rates, though it is not implausible to surmise that monetary policy-either anticipated or unanticipated-has some substantial influence on those rates.
The estimation period is October 1979 to July 2007. The starting date is chosen because many commentators have claimed that the Volcker era represented a break in US monetary policy, so that there may be a break point in the data-generating process for nominal interest rates and inflation. We chose to base the coefficient estimates on data only through July 2007 because we are concerned that the dramatic fluctuations in the economic variables in the last two years may have an undue influence on our coefficient estimates. With the coefficient estimates in hand, we use standard present value VAR calculations to get estimates of R t monthly through October 2009 (using the usual, rather than out of sample, formulas even for data after July 2007). We then compute Λ t = −q t − R t . (Here and in the remainder of the paper, we ignore sample means.) Table 1 reports some statistical properties of these estimated variables. For each country, the diagonal elements are the standard deviations of q t , R t , and Λ t , and the off-diagonal elements are the correlations.
From Table 1 , we note that Λ t is more volatile than R t . In two cases, Japan and the United Kingdom, in which Λ t and R t are negatively correlated, we find that Λ t is even more volatile than the real exchange rate. In all cases, Λ t and q t are highly negatively correlated, with all of the correlation coefficients being larger than 0.9 in absolute value.
The fact that the standard deviation of Λ t is almost as large as the standard deviation of q t , and the fact that Λ t and q t are highly negatively correlated, might tempt one to conclude that we can attribute almost all movements in q t to movements in the level risk premium. But this is misleading for two reasons. The first-which we ignore in the rest of the discussion-is that Λ t impounds any discrepancy between our VAR estimate of R t and the analogue computed using market expectations. The second is that Table  1 does not represent an orthogonal decomposition of the volatility of the real exchange rate. In many cases, R t and Λ t are correlated. In some cases (Canada and the eurozone) the correlation is positive, while for the United Kingdom it is strongly negative. The correlation between the long term real interest rate and the real exchange rate is negative for most of the currency pairs (the exceptions being the United Kingdom and, weakly, Japan). Coincidentally, for the weighted average real exchange rate, R t and Λ t are nearly uncorrelated. We can see in this case that the level risk premium accounts for a very large share of the variance of q t (approximately 94.6 percent.)
The overall conclusion is that while there is a fairly robust negative correlation between the long run real interest rate differential and the real value of the dollar, the correlation is strongest only when the long run real interest differential is highly positively correlated with the level risk premium. That is, in cases where the real exchange rate seems to vary strongly inversely with the long run real interest rate, we cannot separate out a real-interest rate effect from a risk premium effect. In all cases, as we have noted, there is a strong correlation between the level risk premium and the real exchange rate.
The real exchange rate is negatively correlated with R t for four of the six currencies we report. When we estimate R t for the French, German, and Italian currencies separately, we also find a negative correlation. This is an interesting finding because it is supportive of the literature that links real exchange rates to real interest differentials and is perhaps surprising in light of the empirical literature on uncovered interest parity.
The literature on real exchange rates from the 1970s and 1980s emphasized the role of real interest differentials in driving real exchange rates. Jeffrey A. Frankel (1979) showed how an increase in a country's short term real interest But our findings might be surprising if one considers the well-known uncovered interest parity puzzle and many of the attempts to account for the finding theoretically. When expressed in real terms (using real interest rates and real exchange rates), the puzzling empirical finding is that q t+1 − q t and r t US − r t * are negatively correlated. Since, E t q t+1 − q t should equal r t US − r t * under risk-neutral uncovered interest parity, the negative correlation implies that the risk premium, λ t is negatively correlated with the interest differential. One might be tempted to conclude (as some studies imply), that the risk premium can be described by:
where γ is a constant (γ > 1 allows a negative correlation between E t q t+1 − q t and r t US − r t * ), and ε t is a mean-zero random error uncorrelated with r t US − r t * . If this were correct, then equation (1) could be expressed as (4) E t q t+1 − q t = (1 − γ)( r t US − r t * ) + ε t .
Solving this equation forward implies:
Equation (5) implies a positive relationship between q t and R t , but our estimates tend to find the opposite relationship.
In most cases, we find a relationship between real exchange rates and real interest rates that is consistent with some monetary models of real exchange rates but perhaps at odds with many risk based explanations of the interest-parity puzzle. Engel (2010) explores this and related findings and their implications for models of the foreign exchange risk premium.
II. The Crisis
We now turn to examination of the US real exchange rate during the global financial crisis and in its aftermath (July 2007-October 2009). We focus on trends that persisted for at least a few months. We acknowledge that even a few months may be too short a period to apply a model like ours; a negative correlation between q and R, for example, might not be manifest in short time periods. With that bit of caution, we plunge in. Figure 1 plots fitted values for q t , R t , and Λ t for the aggregate of the six currencies. We omit the graphs for the other currencies in order to save space. Their behavior generally mimics that of the six-currency aggregate.
2 First, we discuss the behavior of the real exchange rate itself. We refer to Figure 1 and identify three distinct sub-periods during the crisis. It is difficult to tell a simple story tying the movements in the real exchange rate q t to the long run real interest rate, R t . Recall from equation (2) that q t = −R t − Λ t + __ q , so the sum of the R t and Λ t is the negative of the real exchange rate (up to a constant term.) Figure 1 shows that the US real interest rate began increasing relative to its partners in October 2008, so that perhaps some of the real appreciation of the dollar in late 2008 can be attributed to a real interest rate effect. However, there are two reasons not to put too much weight on this observation. First, according to this measure, the relative real interest rate increase continued through July 2009, a period over which the dollar began to depreciate substantially. In fact, before October 2008 there is not a close (negative) correspondence between the real interest differential and the real exchange rate either. Second, our estimates of this real interest differential during 2008 are sensitive to the sample period over which the VAR is estimated. We tried estimating the VAR beginning in January 1984, since the change in monetary policy regime initiated in 1979 may have been phased in gradually. When the parameters are estimated over this shorter sample, our R t series shows a decline over all of 2008. Of course, over short samples the co-movements between q t and our estimate of R t might not accurately reflect the true data generating process. It is, however, possible to tell a story about the risk premium term Λ t driving movements in the real exchange rate, one that involves financial markets. This story finds occasional corroboration in the business press, as represented by Economist magazine; our quotes below are selective in that the Economist referenced the risk premium in a minority of its analyses of the US dollar. The real dollar depreciation from approximately late July 2007 until March 2008 is reflected in a decline in Λ t , or an increase in the risk premium on dollar assets: "confidence in the resilience of the US financial system has been shaken" (Economist 12/19/07). It is notable that the risk premium on the dollar increased during the early period of the crisis. It appears that the markets initially treated the crisis as an American problem that raised the riskiness of US assets. The dollar depreciated in real terms against all the currencies from July 2007 until March 2008, with the notable exception of the pound. During this time, the dollar did initially depreciate against the pound but subsequently began to appreciate in mid-September 2007. That coincides with the collapse of Northern Rock, the United Kingdom's fifth largest mortgage lender. But then, remarkably, the dollar began to appreciate strongly in real terms between March 2008 and March 2009. We offer two interpretations. One is that the US and UK financial crisis morphed into a global financial crisis with the failure of the major investment banks. The dollar was now seen as a "safe haven" (Economist 11/19/08), and so there was an increase in Λ t . Alternatively, Λ t does not represent a risk premium on foreign assets, but instead a liquidity premium: in fall 2008 "scared investors … were lured by the liquidity of the vast market for US Treasuries" (Economist 6/11/09). Financial institutions, in particular, were reluctant to sell any dollar denominated assets and were trying to shore up their balance sheets by acquiring safe dollar assets such as US Treasury securities. Interest-bearing securities denominated in other currencies were not considered to be as useful for this purpose, so their expected yield had to increase to sell on the market. The real exchange rate is a useful indicator of the market's perception of relative risk. A case can be made that it conveys the message that the markets perceived the subprime crisis initially as a US crisis, and then a UK crisis. It was only in early 2008 that the markets began to perceive a global crisis, at which time the dollar became a safe haven. As matters worsened in September 2008, the dollar assets continued to be considered safe. We believe, also, that the changes in the exchange rates over this period present a challenge for economic models of the exchange rate. It is apparent that the models need to incorporate some measure of financial risks and liquidity in order to capture the broad movements of the exchange rate.
